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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In The Matter of TOME WCLEY,
Petitioner,
-against-

STATE OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY
SUPERVISION,
Respondent,

For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and RuIes.

.

Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
RJI # 01-14-ST6335 IndexNo. 5000-14
I

Appearances:

Tonis Wdey
Znmate No. 89-C-0389
Petitioner, Pro Se
Collins Correctional Facility
Middle Road
P.O. Box 340
Collins, NY 14034-0490
Eric T. Schneideman
Attorney General
State of New York
Attorney For Respondent
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
(Justin L. Engel,
Assistant Attorney General
of Counsel)

George B. Cere&, k,Justice

The petitioner, an inmate currently housed

at

CoIlins Correctional Facility,

comenced the instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a deterihination of respondent
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dated October 9,2013 to deny petitioner discretionary reIease 04parole. The petitioner is
serving a controlling term of 25 p a s to life upon conviction of murder Pddegree, GM
possession of stolenproperty 4* degree, grand larceny 4’ degree, and reckZess endangerment
1‘ degree. Among the numerous arguments set forth in the petition, petitioner indicates that

he has completed several institutionalprograms includingAggression Replacement Training,

Alcohol and Substance Abuse Treatment and Alternative to Violence. He maintains that he

now has a new way of thinkingwhich he did not have in the 1980s. He maintains that he has
a

deep sense of remorse for his crimes. He argues that he has attempted to rehabilitate

himself. For example he indicates that while institutionalized he enrolled in the Plumbers
Apprentice Program, and obtained an Associates Degree in Applied Sciences €?omCorning
CommuniEy College. He indicates that he has had a clean disciplinary record since 5997. He
criticizes the Parole Board for not considering his rehabilitative efforts, including the

foregoing,.He indicates has family support from his mather, brother and sister;and that upon
being release he would get a job in his son’s contracting business. He would also comply
with supervision requirements, and attend all treatment program.

The petitioner contends that the respondent failed to establish witten procedures

which incorporated risk and needs principles for making parole decisions, as required under
Executive Law $ 259-c (4).

He mentions that the Parole Board failed to prepare a

Transitional Accountability Plan (“TAP”) for him. In his view, the Parole Board violated his
right to Due Process. As part of this argument he maintains that the parole decision was

“conclusory, arbitrary and impermissible”. In petitioner’s view, nothing in the record
supports the Parole Board’s conclusion that he is likely to re-offend if released. He also
argues that the Parole Board failed to consider the statutory factors under Executive Law 6
2
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2594. He asserts that the Parole Board was improperly focused on the past, ratha tban
looking forward t~ the fum;and that the Parole Board c r ~ ~ n t h ~ aepattan
[ d ] of [] denying
parole solely because of his criminal record’’ which, he maintains, constitutes an unlawfhl
re-sentencing. He contends that the Parole Boardadopteda hostile attitude towards him; and

“impemissibly considered the heinous nature of the offense”, which did not, in his view,

warrant a sentence of 25 years to life.
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole
are set forth as follows:

“Denied - Hold 24 until October 2015
“Parole is denied. After a review of the record and interview,
the panel has determined that if released at this time, there is a
reasonable probability that you would not live and remain at
liberty without again violating the law and your release would
be incckpatible with the welfare of society. This decision is
based on the following factors. Your instant offenses are
murder second, reckless endmgement first, grand larceny
fourth, and criminal possession of stolen property fourth,
wherein you caused the death of a female by placing a bag over
her head. You then stole her property which included a german
shepherd puppy, her vehicle and household items. You were on
parole at the time of the instant offense. You record dates back
to 1976 and includes: felonies, misdemeanors, prior violence,
prior prison and/or jail, and faiIure at prior community
supervision. You clearly failed to benefit from prior efforts at
rehabilitation. Note is made by this Board of your sentencing
minutes, COMPAS Risk Assessment, rehabilitative efforts,
i s h , needs, parole pian, disciplinary record, remorse, positive
presentation and all other required factors.”

Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory

requirements, not reviewable d
12
,
1 AD3d I 1 52, I 152-1 153 [3d

Dept., 20141; Matter of Williams v New York State Division o f Parole, 114 AD3d 992 [3d
Dept., 2014; Matter of Campbell v Evans, 104 AD3d 1363, 1363-1364 [3d Dept., 20131).
3
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Futhermore, only a “show@gof irrationality bordering on impropriety” on the part of the
Parole Board has been found to necessitate judicial intervention

Matter of Sifmon v

Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476[2000], quoting Matter of Rwso v, New York State Bd, of Parole,
50 NY2d 69,77 [1980]; see also Matter of Graziano v Evans, 90 AD3d 1367, 1369 [3d

Dept., 2011I). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the

discretionary determination made by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v. New York
State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., ZOOZ]).

A review ofthe transcript of the parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant
offense, attention was paid to such factors as petitioner’sinstitutional programming, his clean
disciplinary record since 1997, support of his family, and his plans upon release. The Board
noted that the COMPAS fisk Assessment ranked him as low risk of violence, arrest and

absconding, but that his history of violence was high.

The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its
decision and its determinatign was supported by the record. The decision was sufficiently

detailed to inform the petitioner of the reasons for the denial of parole and it satisfied the
requirements ofExecutiveLaw 82594 (%Matter of Siao-Pao, 1 1 NY3d 773 [2008]: Matter

of Whitehead v. Russi, 201 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Green v. New York State
Division of Parole, 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 19933). It is proper and, in fact, required, that
the Parole Board consider the seriousness of the inmate‘scrimes and their violent nature fsee

Matter of Williams v New York State Division of Parole, supra; Matter of Matos v New
YorkStateBoardofParole, 87AD3d 1193 [3dDept., 201 1I;Matter ofDudievvTravis,227

AD2d 863, [3rd Dept., 1996), as well as the inmate’scriminal history

Matter of Farid v

Travis 239 AD2d 629 [3rd Dept.,’19971; Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd

-3

4
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Dept., 19981). The Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each
factor that it considered in determining the inmate‘s application, or to expressly discuss ea&

one (seeMatter of Davis v Evans, 105 AD3d 1305 [3d Dept., 20 131; Matter of MacKenzie
v Evans, 95 AD3d 1613 [3d Dept., 20121; Matter of Matos v New York State Board of

Parole. supra; Matter ofYoun~
v New York Division of Parole, 74 AD3d 168 1,168 1 - I682

[3d Dept., 2010J).Nor must the parole board recite the precise statutory language set forth

in the first sentence of Executive Law 5 2594 (2) (c)(A) &Matter of Silver0 v Dennison,
28 AD3d 859 [3d Dept., 20061). In other words, “[wlhere appropriate the Board may give

considerable weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for
which a petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s criminal history, together with the
other statutory factors, in determining whether the individual ‘will live and remain at Iiberty

without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare
of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to

undermine respect for [the] iaw”’ (Matter of Durio v New York Strate Division of Parole, 3

AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $2594 [Z][c] [A], other citations
omitted).

Petitioner’s claims that the determination to deny parole was tantamount to a

resentencing, are conclusory and without merit (E Matter of Bockeno v New York State
Parole Board, 227 AD2d 75 1 13‘ Dept., 19961; Matter of Crews v New York State Executive
Department Board of Appeals Unit, 281 AD2d 672 13’ Dept., 20011; Matter of Evans v

Demison, 13 Misc3d 12368, [Sup. Ct., West. Co.,20061; Matter ofKalwasinski vPaterson,
80AlD3d 1065,1066 [3dDept.,2011];MatterofCartervEvans, 81 AD3d 1031,1031 [3d
Dept., 201 I]; Matter of Valentino v Evans, 92 AD3d 1054 [3d Dept., 20121). The fact that
5
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an inmate has served his or her minimutn sentence does not confer upon the inmate a
protected liberty interest in parole
: release (see M

54 AD3d I 114,

1f 15 [3d Dept., ZOOS]). The Parole Board is vested with the discretion to determinewhether

release was appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing court set the minimum
term of petitioner's sentence & Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000];
&latter of Gomez v New York State Division of Parole, 87 AD3d 1197 [3d Dept., 201 11;

Matter of Cody v Debson, 33 AD2d 1141, I142 [3d Dept., 20061 Iv denied 8 NY3d 802
120071; Matter of Burress v Dennison, 37 AD3d 930 [3"' Dept-,20071).

With regard to petitioner's arguments concerning an alleged vioIation of his right to

due process, the Court first observes that there is no inherent right to parole under the
constitution of either the United States or the State of New York (see Greenholtz v Inmates

of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 US 1 , 7 [19791;Matter of Russo v
New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 73, supra). It has been repeatedly held that
.Executive Law 6 2594 does not create in any prisoner an entitlement to, or a legitimate
errpe&ttion of, releask; therefore, no constitutionally protected iiberty interests are implicated
by the Parole Board's exercise of its discretion to deny parole (&g B m a v Travis, 239 F3d

169, 171 [Zd Cir., 20011; Marvin v Goord, 255 F3d 40, 44 [2d Cir., 20011; Boothe v

Hammock, 605 F2d661,664 [2d Ck., ~ ~ ~ ~ ] ; P ~ u ~ & ~ o v H ~516F
I I NSUPP
I I o 1367,1367c~,
1368 [SDNY, 19811;Matter OfRusso vNew York State Bd. ofparole, 50 NY2d 69,75-76,

supra. Matter of Gamez v Demison, 18 AD3d 1099 [3rd Dept., 20051; Matter of Lozada v
New York State Div. of ParoIe, 36 AD3d 1046, 1046 [3rd Dept., 20071). The Court,

accordingly, finds no due process violation.
Petitioner's contention regarding respondent's failure to promulgate regulations
6
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pursuant to the 201 1 amendments to Executive Law $259-c (4) has been reviewed by other

courts and found to be of no merit (see Matter of Montane v Evans, 116 AD3d 187,200-303

[ZO141, appeal dismissed 24 N Y 3 d 1052 [20 141; see also Matter of Sin& v Evans, 118 AR3 d
1209, 1210 [3d Dept., 20141).

Here, the Parole Board properly engaged in a risk and needs assessment as required

under Executive Law 8 259-c (4), including review of the COMPAS instrument (see Matter
of Delrosario v Evans, 121 AD3d 1152, supra; Matter of Partee v Evans, 117 AD3d 1258,
1259 [3d Dept., 20141, lv denied 24 NY3d 901 [2014]).

“The COMPAS instrument,

however, is only one factor that the Board was required to consider in evaluating petitioner’s
request” &latter of Matter of Rivera v New York State Div. of Parole, 119 AD3d 1107,1109

[3d Dept., 20141).
With regard to petitioner’s argument that the respondent failed to prepare a
transitbud accountability plan (,,TW’) as required under Correction Law 8 71-a, “[t]he

language of the statute clearly applies only to newly admitted prisoners and is prospective

in nature”

Matter of Matter of Rivera v New York State Div. of Parole, 1I9 AD3d 1107,

1108-1109 [3dDept.,2014]). CorrectionLaw 5 71-awasenactedonMarch31,2011 and

was effective six months thereafier & L 201 1, ch 62,§ 1, part C , 5 I, subpart A, $6 16-a,
49 [h]; Rivera v New York State Div. of Parole, supra). In this instance, the petitioner was

received into custody by DOCCS on April 10, 1989. As such, the respondent was not
required to prepare a TAP.

Lastly, the Parole Board‘s decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24
months) is within the Board‘s discretion and was supported by the record lsee Matter of
Campbell v Evans, 106 AD3d 1363, supra, at 1364, citing Matter of Tatta v State of New

7
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York Division of ParoIe, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 20021, Iv denied 98 M 2 d 604 [2002]).
The Court has reviewed petitioner's remaining arguments and contentions and finds
them to be without merit.

The Court fmds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of
l a m procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The

petition must therefore be dismissed.

The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the
petitioner were submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by separate order,
is sealing all records submitted for in cumem review.
Accordingly, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed.

This shall constitute the decision, order aud judgment of the Court. The original
decisiodorcterljudgment is returnedto the attorney for the respondents. All other papers are
being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing. The signing of this

decisiodorderljudgment and delivery of this decisiodorderljudgment does not constitute
entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved firom the applicable

provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry and notice of entry.

ENTER
n

n

I

Dated:

George B. Caesia, Jr.
Supreme Court: Justice
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Papers Considered:

I.
2.

Order To Show Cause dated October 9,2014, Petition, SupportingPapers
and Exhibits
Respondent's Answer dated December 19,2014, Supporting Papers and

Exhibits
3.

Affirmtion of Terrence X.Tracy, Esq., dated December 8,2014,
Supporting Papers and Exhibits
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